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Abstract
Background: There has been an increased interest in the role of a human rights framework to
mobilize resources for health.
Discussion: This paper argues that the human rights framework does provide us with an
appropriate understanding of what values should guide a nation's health policy, and a potentially
powerful means of moving the health agenda forward. It also, however, argues that appeals to
human rights may not necessarily be effective at mobilizing resources for specific health problems
one might want to do something about. Specifically, it is not possible to argue that a particular
allocation of scarce health care resources should be changed to a different allocation, benefiting
other groups. Lack of access to health care services by some people only shows that something has
to be done, but not what should be done.
Summary: The somewhat weak claim identified above together with the obligation to realize
progressively a right to health can be used to mobilize resources for health.
Background
During the past few years there has been an increasing
interest in attempts to utilize a human rights framework
to argue that we have obligations, in one way or another,
to do something about the human suffering among the
large number of poor in the world. The argument is that
the suffering of the poor is a violation of their human
rights, and the international human rights instruments
place an obligation on us to do something about it. The
exact details of the argument vary among different com-
mentators, but they all have in common this basic argu-
ment structure. Rarely, however, are we provided with any
details about exactly how one should understand particu-
lar violations of human rights or exactly how one arrives
at recommending a particular action to rectify the alleged
violation of a human right. Nevertheless, many are confi-
dent that a linkage to human rights will prove useful when
we want to mobilize resources for the world's poor. In the
words of Paul Farmer
Of course, it is easy to demand more resources; what is
hard is to produce them. But if social and economic rights
are acknowledged as such, then foundations, govern-
ments, businesses, and international financial institu-
tions-many of them awash in resources-may be called on
to prioritize human rights endeavors that reflect the para-
digm shift advocated here [1], p. 244.
In this paper I want to examine this claim as it relates to
health: How can one use a human rights framework to
mobilize resources for health? If we want to use this
framework presumably we can make demands on the
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resources can argue that the total amount available to pro-
mote health should be increased, or they can argue that
the allocation of available resources should be made in a
different way, giving them access to health care services,
but denying other, less deserving groups access. One may,
of course, also wish to make both demands. In this paper
I shall argue that the human rights framework does pro-
vide us with an appropriate understanding of what values
should guide a nation's health policy, and a potentially
powerful means of moving the health agenda forward. I
shall, however, also argue that appeals to human rights
may not necessarily be effective at mobilizing resources
for specific health problems one might want to do some-
thing about.
Discussion
The international human rights framework
One may understand the claim that "health is a human
right" in at least three different ways. First, we may simply
want to say that health is important, that we should all do
what we can to promote health, and we may even expect
that referring to health as a human right might produce an
emotional response in our audience, motivating them to
action. If this is what we want to do, and if claiming that
"health is a human right' does in fact produce this type of
response, then utilizing a rights framework can indeed be
expected to mobilize resources. While it is undoubtedly
true that this strategy will sometimes be effective, its effec-
tiveness will more often than not depend on the immedi-
ate reaction to the deprivation of a particular group, and
that group's ability to elicit sympathy for their cause,
rather than a legitimate policy response where all compet-
ing claims have been taken into account. Second, we may
want to make a moral claim of a particular type. There is
an extensive philosophical discussion of how one should
understand the concept of "a right" in general, and a
"right to health" in particular. While not denying the
importance of this discussion, it does not have much rel-
evance to the problem addressed in this paper: does one
have a reason to believe that the claim that "health is a
human right" will mobilize resources for health? Even if
we take the strongest claims to be true, for example that
there are moral obligations on each one of us to do some-
thing quite specific to improve other people's health, we
still have to provide an account of how to translate these
moral obligations into effective action. That is why I want
to limit my discussion to an understanding of "health as a
human right" as those specific legal obligations on states
that arise out of international law. International law in
this context refers primarily to The Covenant on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights, but also the General Com-
ment by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Right on article 12 (on the right to health) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and the first report of the recently appointed Spe-
cial Rapporteur with a mandate to focus on the right to
health [2,3]. In addition, there are a number of cases that
have been decided on the basis of a right to health. These
cases are particularly important when we attempt to
understand what is meant by a "right to health" in inter-
national law. If we take a right to health in this third sense,
we have at least in principle identified a way of under-
standing rights that can lead to an effective mobilization
of resources.
The issue to be addressed is therefore: Can one on the
basis of international law argue that a person's right to
health is violated if that person is denied access to health
care services or the underlying determinants of health on
economic grounds; that is, either because that person does
not have sufficient resources herself to pay for the services
or the state claims that it does not have sufficient
resources to pay for the necessary services. If one could
establish that such cases are violations of international
law, then one would have an effective way of mobilizing
resources for health based on a human rights framework.
If one adopts this approach, one challenge is, in the words
of the Special Rapporteur, that "although there is a grow-
ing national and international jurisprudence on the right
to health, the legal content of the right is not yet well
established (#39)". Some indication of how one should
understand the right to health in international law is nev-
ertheless provided in the key, authoritative documents
and in the court cases that have been decided on the basis
of right to health challenges. Some of the statements made
in the General Comment might indeed lead one to believe
that a state has strong legal obligations to provide suffi-
cient resources to ensure adequate health for all. It is said,
for example, that "health facilities, goods and services
must be affordable for all. Payment for health care serv-
ices, as well as services related to the underlying determi-
nants of health, have to be based on the principle of
equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or
publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially
disadvantaged groups (12 1 iii). One could take this to
mean that it prohibits denial of health care services on
economic grounds. Other statements seem to support this
claim " [F]unctioning public health and health care facili-
ties, goods and services, as well as programmes, have to
available in sufficient quantity within the State party
(12(1)). Central to the General Comment is the principle
of non-discrimination: "...the Covenant [on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights] proscribes any discrimination
in access to health care and underlying determinants of
health ... on the grounds of race, colour, .... health status
... and civil, political, social or other status" (18). This is
reinforced by the special rapporteur: "Accordingly, inter-
national human rights law proscribes any discriminationPage 2 of 8
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of health, on the internationally prohibited grounds,
including health status, which has the intention or effect
of impairing the equal enjoyment of the right to health"
(26).
Taken together, these statements seem to give a strong
endorsement to the claim that it is a violation of a per-
son's health rights to deny him treatment on the grounds
that treating that person is too expensive for the state. If
one denied treatment to persons who happen to have dis-
eases that are expensive to treat, one does indeed discrim-
inate on the basis of "health status", one of the prohibited
grounds, and one does not ensure equal access to health
care services to all.
There is, however, one important qualification to this
claim. Although the state has an obligation to provide
health care in "sufficient quantity", "the precise nature of
the facilities, goods and services will vary according to
numerous factors, including the State party's develop-
mental level" (12 1). Furthermore, "the Covenant pro-
vides for progressive realization and acknowledges the
constraints due to the limits of available resources" (30).
It is, therefore, in spite of the strong statements that every-
one should be assured access to health care, in principle
legitimate for a state to claim that it can deny access to
health care to patient groups who happen to have diseases
that are expensive to treat.
A state's claim that it does not have sufficient resources to
provide access to health care or its determinants to a par-
ticular group because of its costs can, of course, be chal-
lenged. We would then need some principled way of
adjudicating between the competing claims: on the one
hand those of the group denied health care access claim-
ing that its health rights are violated and on the other
hand those of state claiming that its resources can be uti-
lized better elsewhere. The official documents on how we
should understand a right to health do not provide us
with much guidance on how one should adjudicate
between such competing claims. As we shall see in the
next section, neither apparently do the cases which have
been brought forward as violations of a right to health.
The lack of a principled way of adjudicating between 
competing claims
The two recent South African cases provide a particular
striking example of the challenge of using a reference of a
right to health or the courts to mobilize resources for
health. The South African constitution, article 27 (1) gives
everyone a right to have access to health care services,
including reproductive health care and in article 27 (2) it
says that the state must take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization of these rights. These national
provisions, of course, reflect the ones in the UN Covenant.
In November 1997, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa decided on a case involving the scope of such a
"right to health" [4]. The case involved a diabetic man
with ischaemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease
with chronic kidney failure. He was rejected for the dialy-
sis program on the grounds that there was a shortage of
dialysis machines and dialysis had to be reserved for peo-
ple with acute renal failure or for patients who are candi-
dates for kidney transplantation. He appealed this
decision to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that
the South African Constitution gives every person a right
to life and that nobody may be denied emergency medical
treatment. The Court rejected the appeal on the grounds
that this was not an emergency treatment, and that a right
to life should be interpreted as a right to non-interference,
but not necessarily a duty to sustain life. In the words of
the Court
"It [article 27(3)] provides reassurance to all members of
society that accident and emergency departments will be
available to deal with unforeseeable catastrophes which
could befall any person, anywhere and at any time" (sec-
tion 51)
and
The applicant suffers from chronic renal failure. To be
kept alive by dialysis he would require such treatment two
to three times a week. This is not an emergency which calls
for immediate remedial treatment. It is an ongoing state
of affairs resulting from a deterioration of the applicant's
renal function which is incurable" (section 21)
Although the appellant did not appeal the decision on the
basis of the South African Constitution's article 27 (1) giv-
ing everyone a right to have access to health services, the
Court did discuss this matter. The Court pointed out that
it is not disputed that the Department of Health
"does not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the
services which are being provided to the public ... This is a
nation-wide problem and resources are stretched in all
renal clinics throughout the land. Guidelines have there-
fore been established to assist the persons working in
these clinics to make the agonising choices which have to
be made in deciding who should receive treatment and
who not" (section 24).
The Court further maintained that the current guidelines
are justified by the fact that more patients would benefit
from the limited resources available than by any alterna-
tive use of resources, and that "it has not been suggested
that these guidelines are unreasonable or that they werePage 3 of 8
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taken by the Addington Hospital that the appellant did
not qualify for dialysis" (section 25).
The second case involves use of nevirapine to prevent peri-
natal HIV transmission[5,6]. As is well know, the South
African government has until recently refused or been
reluctant to provide antiretroviral treatment for HIV, both
for HIV positive people and to pregnant women to pre-
vent perinatal HIV transmission. The South African Treat-
ment Action Campaign brought a suit against the
government that the policy regarding the use of nevirap-
ine violated the constitutional right to health. The
Supreme Court ruled in 2002 with the Treatment Action
Campaign, affirming that the government's policy vio-
lated the Constitution's right to health. It is important,
however, to note the basis for this ruling.
The South African government had claimed that provid-
ing nevirapine to pregnant women would be too costly in
terms of infrastructure, in particular provision of testing
and counseling, and that its safety and efficacy had not
been sufficiently demonstrated in a South African context.
The Supreme Court disagreed with both of these claims.
The issue was "whether it was reasonable to exclude the
use of nevirapine for the treatment of mother-to-child
transmission at those public hospitals and clinics where
testing and counseling are available". Regarding the safety
and efficacy issue, the court cited scientific opinions
which made these claims completely unreasonable.
The Court did not address the issue of an appropriate allo-
cation of resources. Accepting the Court's decision would
not require the South African government to allocate
additional resources to health care delivery nor would it
require it to re-allocate existing resources for health:
A potentially lifesaving drug was on offer and where test-
ing and counseling facilities were available it could have
been administered within the available resources of the
state without any known harm to mother and child.
In fact, the Court, as in the dialysis case, rejected any role
for the courts in resource allocation decisions, instead
adopting a criterion of evaluating government policies on
the basis of a criterion of "reasonableness", from a previ-
ous right to housing case. In this previous case, the court
would not decide "whether other more desirable or
favourable measures could have been adopted, or
whether public money could have been better spent"[7]
(41). A policy is reasonable if it is comprehensive and well
coordinated; is balanced, and does not exclude a signifi-
cant segment of society; and responds to the urgent needs
of those in desperate circumstances. In the nevirapine case
the Court affirmed that any right did not impose an obli-
gation on the state "to go beyond available resources or to
realise these rights immediately" (para 32). The court did
concede that it would be reasonable for the government to
carry out a research project to determine the safety of the
drug before a wider implementation, but that it would not
be reasonable to deny people access to the drug outside of
research and training sites.
If one therefore follows the views of the South African
Court regarding a right to health, it would seem to be dif-
ficult to use the courts to challenge a particular allocation
of health care resources. The Court felt that the provincial
administrations should make decisions as to how funds
for health care should be spent and that courts should be
"slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good
faith by the political organs and medical authorities
whose responsibility it is to deal with these matters" (sec-
tion 29).
And
"courts are not the proper place to resolve the agonising
personal and medical problems that underlie these
choices. Important though our review functions are, there
are areas where institutional incapacity and appropriate
constitutional modesty require us to be especially cau-
tious. Our country's legal system simply cannot replace
the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the
patient, those caring for the patient, and those who care
about the patient. The provisions of the bill of rights
should furthermore not be interpreted in a way which
results in courts feeling themselves unduly pressurized by
the fear of gambling with the lives of claimants into order-
ing hospitals to furnish the most expensive and improba-
ble procedures, thereby diverting scarce medical resources
and prejudicing the claims of others" (section 58).
One might, of course, want to criticize this view of the role
of the courts, as has been done by Darrel Moellendorf.[8]
Moellendorf argues that the courts should rule on what is
meant by "within available resources" and that the Con-
stitutional Court previously has recognized that rulings
on socio-economic rights do have budgetary implications:
"the Court's role in upholding socio-economic rights is
not foreseen as limited to the framework of existing
national or provincial budgetary allocations. Rather the
court may pass judgments on these rights, as with other
rights, that require a change in fiscal priorities" (p. 331).
In this paper, however, I shall suggest a different approach
that may be more promising if one wants to use an appeal
to a right to health to mobilize resources for health.
The problem of resource allocation
The central issue with regard to differential access to
health care services is, on what basis one can claim that aPage 4 of 8
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health care, relative to its general wealth, and on what
basis can one claim that a state does not use the resources
it devotes to health care appropriately. If a state does not
allocate sufficient resources to health care, or uses its avail-
able resources inappropriately, a citizen could claim that
the state violates her right to health when a particular
health care intervention is denied her, and when that
intervention would be available to her if the state
increased its allocation to health care to an acceptable
level, or re-allocated resources within the health care sec-
tor to an acceptable mix of interventions.
Focusing attention on this set of questions is important
because they are at the heart of debates about health care
access, in both resource rich and resource poor settings.
We want to know whether denying a person access to a
life-saving intervention because it is too expensive for a
given health care system is a denial of his right to health.
This can be the typical high cost therapies in rich coun-
tries, such as bone marrow transplantation, or it can be
antiretroviral treatment for HIV in resource poorer coun-
tries. If we assume that a state is in principle entitled to
make judgments about when a particular treatment is too
expensive to provide within its healthcare systems, given
available resources, we have to find a way to examine
claims about appropriateness, and provide criteria for
how these judgments are to be made. At least in the two
South African cases the Court has been reluctant to get
involved in this type of questions.
It should come as no surprise that this is the case. As the
ever growing literature on the ethics of health care
resource allocation demonstrates, there is no clear consen-
sus about how one should balance the various legitimate
concerns and values involved in making these kinds of
decisions. Judgments will have to be made, and, unless
there are grave violations of due process, or a gross misap-
plication of the principles of resource allocation, it seems
unlikely that one could make a principled criticism of a
particular decision that could be used as a basis for a claim
against the state. This is probably why the courts have
been reluctant to criticize allocation judgments made in
good faith by government bodies.
In spite of this largely negative conclusion, I shall now nev-
ertheless a strategy that shows that appeals to health as a
human right might nevertheless be used to argue that
denial of care on economic grounds is a violation of that
right.
Using human rights to mobilize resources for health
The central guiding principle in the international health
and human rights documents is that of non-discrimina-
tion. It is prohibited to deny a person access to health care
or its determinants on the basis of characteristics such as
race or religion, but also, as we saw above, on the basis of
social and health status: health care services should be
accessible to everyone, there should be equal access to
health care, and health care should be affordable for all. It
is fairly easy, and uncontroversial, to establish that a pol-
icy such as the one accepted during apartheid in South
Africa, of denying access to health care services on the
basis of race, is a violation of a right to health. It is more
difficult to agree on how we should understand the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination on the basis of social and
health status. One might be tempted to conclude that the
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of social sta-
tus implies a right for everyone to access the same bundle
of health care services. An unqualified acceptance of that
claim, however, would obviously be unacceptable: there
are going to be health care services which provide very lit-
tle benefit, but which are hugely expensive, which may be
accessible to the very rich, but which should not by any
account be included in the bundle of health care services
accessible to all, even by the most egalitarian standards of
justice. We therefore need some account that will specify
which health care services should be accessible to all, even
within a rights approach to health care. In order to give a
satisfactory account of that problem, we again need an
appropriate value framework for prioritization. It seems
to me that there is nevertheless something we can say,
even before we have a fully worked out framework for pri-
oritization, if we take a right to health approach. If a range
of health care services, known to be effective in signifi-
cantly preventing premature death or significantly
increasing quality of life, is available to a substantial por-
tion of a country's population, but is not available to a
particular group of people, such as the very poor, this is a
violation of the right to health of the members of that
group. The qualifiers indicate that a lot of work needs to
be done to give precise content to this claim, but for the
purposes of this discussion, this somewhat vague claim
will be sufficient. It is easy to identify examples: If antiret-
roviral treatment for HIV is available to most people in
country, but is not available to people in the lowest 1%
income bracket, we can conclude that there is a prima
facie violation of their health rights.
Although one might agree that such a principle identified
here does indeed follow from the international human
rights documents, there are some obvious objections if
one's aim is to show that an international human rights
framework can be effective at mobilizing resources for
health. First, if one accepts this principle of non-discrimi-
nation based on social status, why should one not accept
a principle of non-discrimination based on health status,
and argue analogously that if a small group of persons is
denied access to health care services because of the illness
that they happen to have, at the same time as the majorityPage 5 of 8
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nesses, this is an illegitimate form of discrimination? Sec-
ond, can not a state use the same principled objection to
mobilization of resources in cases of discrimination based
on social status, that its limited resources are better used
elsewhere? Third, are any real policy alternatives ruled out
by this principle, or is it not so general that all types of
health policies is compatible with it.
The first criticism says that if we find it objectionable that
the poor are treated differently from the rich with regard
to health care access, why should we not find it objection-
able that those who happen to have late stage breast can-
cer are treated differently from those who happen to have
disease that can be treated more cheaply?
Why could not a person with late stage breast cancer argue
successfully that a decision not to fund the known effec-
tive treatment she suffers from is of the same type as a
decision not to fund treatments the poor suffer from?
One response to this objection would be that decisions
regarding what constitutes a non-discriminatory policy
are different in these two cases. When deciding whether
who to give access to health care services in general, we do
not discriminate on the basis of what illnesses people
have: we look at other characteristics, such as gender, age,
ethnic background, social status, and income level. When
deciding what bundle of health care services to provide
within a nation's health care system, other considerations
are relevant. We would then look at the effect of the vari-
ous interventions, their costs, how each individual bene-
fits from the intervention, and what the cumulative
benefit for the population is. A discriminatory practice in
the first type of decision would be to single out a particu-
lar income group for preferential treatment, while a dis-
criminatory practice of the second type of decision would
be to single out a particular illness for preferential treat-
ment. It would not be discriminatory to distribute
resources on the basis of, for example, health effects of the
various interventions. The reason why we have more
problems in identifying inappropriate discrimination on
the basis of health status is that there is less agreement on
how we should identify interventions that have the same
effect on health status across illness groups.
The second objection is more difficult to answer. Let us
assume that there is a country with a government that tries
to allocate resources justly. Although the government tries
its best, there continues to be lack of access to health care
services to the poor. The government has also done its best
in raising the resources allocated to health care, but they
have still not been able to fund life-saving interventions
for a particular group of patients. Because of its generally
sound economic policies, the country has experienced
more than the expected economic growth over the past
few years, and there is a budget surplus. The government
now has to decide what to do with the additional money:
Should they remove continued barriers of access to the
poor, or should they ensure funded for the neglected dis-
ease? We assume that the government cannot do both. It
seems to me that the principle of non-discrimination
within a human rights approach to health care does not
provide us with guidance about how we should go about
solving this type of problem.
In spite of this problem, there is one answer we can give,
albeit a limited one, but still with a potential for identify-
ing some inadmissible policies this imaginary country
might want to consider. Within the human rights frame-
work there is a recognition that any given country cannot
fulfill its obligations immediately, but there is an obliga-
tion of progressive realization of a right to health. This
places an obligation on the country to do something to
increase access to health care services during periods of
economic growth. On that basis we could justifiably criti-
cize government inaction, but we would not be justified in
proscribe a particular action.
The third objection is that the principle of non-discrimi-
nation is so general that it would not rule out any partic-
ular health policy. This is not the case. One currently
fashionable proposal is that governments should identify
an essential package of health services based on a criterion
of cost-effectiveness. This package should be available to
everyone, regardless of ability to pay. Those who are
wealthy would be able to, or indeed encouraged to, pay
for additional health care services using their own funds.
WHO has called this proposal "the new universalism".
Classic universalism would obligate governments to pro-
vide everything medically useful to everybody. How
should we evaluate this proposal in terms of a human
rights approach to health care delivery?
Let me first examine the arguments in favor of this pro-
posal. First, it is quite clear that the policy is pro-poor, in
the sense that it would increase access to health care serv-
ices for the poor compared with what is currently availa-
ble to them. Data from many country shows that
government subsidies today go disproportionally to the
wealthy to pay for interventions of low cost-effectiveness,
while the poor suffer from conditions which require inter-
ventions of high cost-effectiveness. Requiring that govern-
ments fund a package of services of high cost-effectiveness
available to everyone would therefore shift government
resources from the rich to the poor. Second, according to
the principle of non-discrimination within the human
rights tradition, governments should not discriminate
against a particular group of people in terms of access to
health care services. This policy seems to satisfy thatPage 6 of 8
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and the government does not subsidize health interven-
tions for non-poor if they are not also subsidized for the
poor, unlike what is the case in many countries today. For
these arguments, see [9,10]. The following sentence sums
up the rational for this position:
Although many countries cite equity as the reason for
strong government controls, public sector-controlled pol-
icies do not have a good track record on equity. In Indo-
nesia, for example, the rich receive almost three times as
much public health care as the poor. In China in the early
1980s, rural households-almost 80 percent of the popula-
tion-received just 29 percent of public health spending. In
Tanzania the richest fifth of the population use more than
twice as many government hospital beds and more than
four times as many outpatient services as the poorest fifth.
In Côte d'Ivoire less than one-quarter of the rural poor
who were sick received any form of medical care, as com-
pared with half of the urban rich. In Peru only 20 percent
of the poor received care, versus 57 percent of the rich. In
general, when government expenditures are concentrated
on urban areas and on hospitals rather than on basic serv-
ices, the results are highly inequitable, governments are
essentially subsidizing the rich. [11]
This conclusion only follows, however, if the principle of
government non-discrimination only applies to the pro-
portion of public resources which goes to different popu-
lation groups. If the non-discrimination principle is
limited in this way, and if the public system is available to
everyone regardless of ability to pay, a two-tiered system
where the wealthy have access to a much broader range of
health care services because they are able to pay for the
additional services from their own income is not in con-
flict with a right to health. If, on the other hand, one takes
the position that a right to health should be understood
in terms of equality of access to health services in general,
then an explicit acceptance of at least some types of two-
tiered systems is not in accordance with a right to health.
There are a number of considerations which speak in favor
of this expanded notion of government responsibility. A
government does not only have an obligation to provide
or to finance health care services. In fact, in recent discus-
sions about health sector reform, these types of govern-
ment obligations have been de-emphasized and instead
there has been a focus on a government responsibility to
regulate, facilitate and ensure that people have access to
health care services, whether they are provided or
financed by government, non-profit organizations or for
profit companies. If one takes this role seriously, focusing
only on how government resources are spent is at best
only one component of government obligations to fulfill
the right to health of their population. Persistent inequal-
ities of access to health care, whether they are caused by
imbalances in public resources, or caused by differences in
income between population groups, should therefore be
regarded as an essential concern of equity and rights ori-
ented policies.
Summary
I have in this paper argued that appeals to health as a
human right are not going to be helpful if we want advice
on how we should allocated resources among different
patient groups. Many of the most difficult problems of
resource allocation are therefore not addressed by a
human rights approach. However, I have also argued that
some inequalities of access can be criticized: One can say
that it is a violation of human rights if one group system-
atically has less access to health care services compared
with other groups. There is, however, not much more on
can say; in particular, one cannot proscribe a particular
corrective to that violation of health as a human right. All
one can say is that the state has an obligation to do some-
thing about the injustice.
This result may not be very satisfactory for those who are
concerned about doing something about lack of access to
health care. However, if one takes the requirement of pro-
gressive realization seriously, together with the periodic
reporting requirement, one might conceivably have a
powerful basis for criticism of government policies. Gov-
ernments are obligated to report to the UN, and, as I have
shown, there is a basis on which one can criticize them for
not fulfilling their health rights, also with regard to their
economic policies. This creates an obligation on countries
to show that something has been done when the next peri-
odic report is done to and they would have to take steps
to improve access in some respects. While this may seem to
be a modest requirement, it can, together with appropri-
ate political pressure, lead to significant, positive changes
in health care systems. But it is undeniable that it is much
less than what many who advocate a human rights
approach to health care access hope can be achieved by
utilizing this framework. It is also true that it is generally
recognized that the reporting requirements, at least with
regard to health, are not very effective. Strengthening the
reporting and monitoring mechanisms of the UN system
with regard to health should therefore be the highest pri-
ority for those who want to emphasize a human rights
approach to health sector reform.
Competing interests and acknowledgments
The opinions expressed are the author's own. They do not
reflect any position or policy of the National Institutes of
Health, Public Health Service, or Department of Health
and Human Services.Page 7 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC International Health and Human Rights 2004, 4:4 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/4/4Publish with BioMed Central   and  every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright




1. Farmer Paul: Pathologies of power. Health, human rights and
the new war on the poor. Berkeley, University of California Press;
2003. 
2. Special Rapporteur: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health. New York, United
Nations; 2003. 
3. CESCR: The right to the highest attainable standard of
health, CESCR General Comment 14. New York, Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations; 2000. 
4. Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1998,: . 1) SA 765
(CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC). 
5. Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Cam-
paign and Others. .
6. Annas George J: The right to health and the nevirapine case in
South Africa. New England Journal of Medicine 2003, 348:750-754.
7. Grootboom: Government of the Republic of South Africa and
Others vs. Grootboom. Grootboom) 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001. 
8. Moellendorf Darrel: Reasoning about Resources: Soobra-
money and the Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims.
South African Journal of Human Rights 1998, 14:327-333.
9. Musgrove P: La eficacia en funcion de los costos y la reforma
del sector salud. Salud Publica Mex 1995, 37:363-374.
10. Birdsall Nancy, James Estelle: Health, government and the poor:
The case for the private sector. The epidemiological transition Policy
and planning implications for developing countries Edited by: Gribble
James N and Preston Samuel H. Washington DC, National Academy
Press; 1993:229-251. 
11. van der Gaag Jacques: Private and public initiatives:  Working
together for  health and education. Directions in Development
Series Washington DC, World Bank; 1995. 
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/4/4/prepubPage 8 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
